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DAVID HURLBUT*

Fixing the Biodiversity Convention:
Toward a Special Protocol for Related
Intellectual Property
ABSTRACT
The trade dispute over intellectual property protection descended
on the 1992 World Conference on Environmentand Development in
Brazil at an awkward time; like an unwanted house guest, no
amount of ignoring it could make it go away. Persistent and
intractable, the controversy confounded negotiations on the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity to such an extent that it left the
treaty little more than an impotent desideratum. The treaty attempts
to promote diversity of species by encouragingdeveloping countries
to preserve their diminishing rain forests, wilderness areas, and
wetlands. Yet it also callsfor the "equitablesharing"of the economic
benefits from patented processes using rareplant and animal species
found in developing countries! These two goals are not necessarily
irreconcilable,but the way diplomats attempted to combine them in
the treaty set the bloc of less-developed countries at loggerheads with
the United States, which refused to sign the agreement on the
grounds that it did not go far enough in guaranteeingpatent rights
affected by the treaty.2
Because negotiations got mired in old economic disputes between
rich and poor nations, the parties' specific obligations under the
Biodiversity Convention are actually minimal. More directly, however,
the failure of the negotiators to find a compromise on the issue of
* David Hurlbut is a professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the
University of Texas at Austin.
1. United Nations Conf. Env't & Dev.: Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992,31 LL.M.
818 (1992) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]. "The objectives of this Convention, to be
pursued in accordance with its relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access
to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account
all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding." Id. at 823,
art. 1.
2. Unitid States: Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment Programme
Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
31 LL.M. 848 (1992).
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intellectual property protection constitutes a missed opportunity. Real
market forces make intellectual property an important trade issue, and
rather than ignoring them, the Biodiversity Convention could have
positively harnessed these market forces for the purpose of preserving
species diversity. This missed opportunity is the main concern of this
article.
With the advent of a new administration, the United States has
signed the treaty; officials anticipate ratification by the United States
Senate sometime in 1994.? But the change in United States policy makes
no substantial impact on the biological diversity debate. Not only do the
fundamental problems with the treaty remain, the Clinton administration
intends to include an interpretive statement with its instrument of
ratification that essentially preserves the original United States position.4
As this article will show, there is a constructive logic behind what the
Clinton administration is trying to do, but qualified ratification by itself
will not be enough to fix what is wrong with the treaty.
Diplomats came to Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to negotiate environmental agreements, not trade issues, and the Biodiversity Convention was
to be one of the crowning accomplishments of the Earth Summit. But
patent protection is normally a trade issue-and a very contentious one.
Thus it is not altogether surprising that the negotiators were able to
address the issue of intellectual property rights in only a superficial way.
The difficulty that arose underscores both the intrinsic links between
environmental and trade issues, and how little the relationship is
understood by advocates on either side. The longer this intellectual
estrangement continues, the longer it will take to realize the goal of
sustainable development, which was the theme of the Earth Summit.
Sustainable development means that current generations must
leave future generations an environment and a stock of natural resources
that is as good and as plentiful as those it received from past generations.' The philosophy also says that technology and social organization
affect the capacity of the biosphere to meet the economic demands placed

3. Remarks on Earth Day, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 630 (Apr. 21 1993); Wirth Predicts
Biodiversity Treaty Will Be Ratified By Senate Within One Year, Chemical Reg. Rep., June
11, 1993, at 604.
4. Wirth Says Test for IPR Protections will be Ratification of Biodiversity Pact,
International Trade Reporter, Sept. 15, 1993. The European Community Commission
recommended attaching a similar interpretive statement to the EC's ratification of the treaty,
but-the European Parliament voted to delete it. The issue was to be resolved by the EC's
Council of Ministers prior to ratification, which as of this writing was expected by the end
of 1993. Parliament Opposes ECC Plan to Link Action on U.N. Treaty to Property Rights
Statement, Int'l Env't Daily, July 9, 1993.
5. For a comprehensive exposition of the theory of intergenerational equity, see E. Weiss,
In Fairness to Future Generations (1988).
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on it.6 International trade is one of the most important forms of social
organization by which natural resources are transformed into economic
prosperity, but there has been little progress in clarifying the environment-related aspects of trade or the trade-related aspects of environmental protection. Intellectual property rights, already a contentious trade
issue even without taking environmental arguments into account, is one
piece of the sustainable development puzzle that needs deliberate and
careful attention. Instead, the biodiversity convention deals with the issue
in the worst possible manner: by equivocation in hopes that the
controversy will simply go away.
What is needed to repair the Biodiversity Convention is a
determined international effort to agree on core principles around which
some consensus may be built. This article introduces one possible
approach: the development of a new category of intellectual property
rights that would be distinct from normal commercial patents and more
relevant to the special circumstances and goals the Biodiversity Convention seeks to address.
The article begins with a discussion of the cultural, legal, and
ethical issues that affect intellectual property rights generally. After
defining relevant terms, the discussion will focus on the ethical issues
affecting policy towards intellectual property-first from the perspective
of European-based political cultures and then in the context of other
cultures. The aim of this section is to show that no sound philosophical
rationale exists for assuming that European-based traditions are superior
to other views as a basis for an international regime of intellectual
property rights. It will also be shown that a government's deliberate
decision not to protect intellectual property rights can raise issues similar
to those involved with nationalization. In fact, one can persuasively argue
that a state is nationalizing an intangible form of property when it adopts
an intentionally weak intellectual property regime.
The second section discusses the economic dynamics of intellectual property rights. The purpose of patents and other intellectual property

6. World Comm'n on Env't & Dev., Our Common Future 43 (1987).
7. In a 1991 case involving U.S. import restrictions on Mexican tuna, a trade arbitration
panel explicitly said that existing rules offered inadequate guidance in cases where trade
and environmental laws conflicted. The panel said the issue should be addressed by the
contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade rather than leaving
arbitration panels to extrapolate rules from too little precedent. See GATT: Dispute
Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Mexico v. United
States), 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1622-23, at § 6 (1991). During the 12 months prior to the Earth
Summit in Rio, both the GATT and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development began to investigate the environmental aspects of international trade, largely
from the standpoint of trade policies. See U.S. International Trade Comm'n, Pub. 2554, The
Year in Trade: Operations of the Trade Agreements Program 13-14 (Aug. 1992).
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is to create monopoly rent for the benefit of those whose inventions may
have social benefit.' The question of political economy is whether it is
worth it to society to pay that rent. The discussion will also show how
the economic benefits of patent protection can bypass the people on
whom the burden of biodiversity falls.
After describing the general legal and economic issues, the paper
will look at how the Biodiversity Convention deals with intellectual
property. It will be apparent that the treaty as currently worded opens a
proverbial Pandora's box; it demonstrates little cognizance of the
difficulty surrounding intellectual property protection, yet puts forward
a sweeping but simplistic criterion for making policy decisions. By not
addressing the issue of intellectual property in a manner that does justice
to its complexity, the treaty actually hinders more than it furthers the
goal of biological diversity.
Finally, this paper will suggest the outline of a protocol in which
the issue of intellectual property may be addressed in a way that is
relevant to the goal of biological diversity. Some of the principles
incorporated in the proposed protocol are drawn from previous
successful environmental treaties such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol to
eliminate ozone-depleting substances. The proposed biodiversity
technology protocol seeks to balance the social needs of both developing
and industrially advanced countries in a way that supports the objectives
of the Biodiversity Convention.'
Different Cultures, Conflicting Ethics
Patents and other types of intellectual property rights are

intended to prevent people from commercially exploiting ideas or

8. Monopoly rents are additional producer earnings that exist because of barriers to
competition, and are thus conceptually different from profits that derive from successful
market competition. The term is defined and explained in detail later in this article. Infra
notes 29-33.
9. "Industrially advanced" refers to countries that have high levels of per-capita income
and a diverse industrial sector. Thus Germany is an industrially advanced country; Saudi
Arabia is not. "Developing" refers to countries that not only have low levels of income, but
also have to deal with significant social problems (illiteracy, high infant mortality, and
malnutrition, for example) that keep incomes low and unevenly distributed. Industrialization may or may not be the best way for a developing country to address its problems,
hence terms such as "less-industrialized" and "industrially backward" are neither
appropriate nor useful. In addition, a developing country may have a diverse industrial base
and still have low incomes and significant social problems; India, Brazil, Argentina, and
China are such countries. The use of the terms "industrially advanced" and "developing"
is intended to distinguish between two classes of countries in a way that is relevant to the
topic at hand.
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inventions without fair compensation to the originators. ° The concept
comprises two competing social objectives: the need to encourage
technical innovation and the need to disperse the benefits of that innovation throughout society. These objectives compete because the market
forces that encourage one discourage the other. Decreasing a good's price
tends to increase its dispersion." But if the price of acquiring the
innovation includes only the cost of raw material (that is, if the idea itself
costs nothing), then the inventor gets no market compensation for his or
her effort. If inventors have no economic incentive to invent, those who
are motivated by profit will come up with fewer innovations to be
dispersed. Conversely, as inventors are able to obtain more monopoly
rent through their patents, their ideas will cost society more. As the
monopoly rent increases, the innovations will be less widely dispersed
and the social benefits will diminish.
As in many other political cultures, the way Europeans dealt with
intellectual property in particular was shaped by the way they thought
of property in general. Hegel, Locke, and other European political
philosophers wrote that property was one of the rights defining
individual liberty. Hegel's conception of property is perhaps most directly
applicable to the narrower notion of intellectual property: he wrote that
property is, among other things, the means by which an individual could
objectively express a personal, singular will. "In property," he noted, "a
person exists for the first time as reason." 2 Hegel's civil society is an
environment in which an individual aspires to establish a unique place,
and property is the vehicle by which one's self-identity is acknowledged
by others who are similarly striving for self-identity.
Locke wrote that in a primitive society where all resources are
initially held in common, objects become property through an individual's labor: gathering the acorns, killing the deer, tilling the land. 3 As
society matures, money becomes an expedient surrogate for the value of
an individual's labor. Still, the essence of property rests not with an

10. The issues raised by the biodiversity treaty deal almost exclusively with patent rights,
therefore the terms "intellectual property" and "patents" will be used interchangeably
throughout this paper. Technically, patents protect novel products and processes, copyrights
protect literary or recorded material, and trademarks protect symbols or names that
uniquely identify the maker of a product. Trade secrets are another kind of intellectual
property. The unique circumstances of high-technology industries has led to yet another
kind of intellectual property category for the design of semiconductor computer chips. See
generally R. Sherwood, Intellectual Property and Economic Development (1990).
11. It can also be dispersed by increasing its value-added potential, thus making it worth
more relative to the price.
12. G. Hegel, Philosophy of Right 235-6 (1967).
13. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government 303-320 (1967).
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object's material characteristics, but in the thought and effort exerted by
the individual upon that object to make it useful.
Two aspects of Hegel and Locke are pertinent to understanding
the European traditions behind intellectual property. First is the
importance given to individual human will in justifying and defining
property. The "quiddity" of property is an intellectual phenomenon that
arises from the way individuals conceive of themselves in their material
environment. Property may therefore be the exertion of will over the
transformation of material things, or it may be the exertion of intellect to
create new ideas. Either would contribute to the Hegelian sense of selfidentity, so a society that values individual liberty would seek to protect
both.
Secondly, the European tradition places the individual and
society in a relationship that is at least partially adversarial. Both Hegel
and Locke envision civil society as a constraining environment for
individuals aspiring to establish unique moral meaning. The marketplace
is the arbiter through which an individual tries to establish and protect
self-identity through voluntary exchange of property representing the
individual's will. Society is thus very limited in its right to prevent an
individual's fair accumulation, holding, and dispensation of property. The
needs of society per se would not justify taking an individual's property-including property in the form of ideas-without fair compensation.
European lawmakers recognized early the social utility of
intellectual property rights; the evolution of intellectual property rights
lagged only slightly behind the evolution of tangible property rights in
European legal traditions. During the Renaissance, patent rights were
bestowed by royalty or, as in the case of Italian city-states, by the ruling
aristocracy. 4 In the 18th and 19th centuries, the European trading
powers entered into compacts providing for the mutual recognition of
each others' patents. This culminated in 1883 with the International
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which included not
only the major European trading powers but their colonies as well.
The European tradition of honoring patents was internationalized
through the institutions of colonialism. That is, intellectual property rights
were honored in Europe and by the Europeans who were governing
Africa, Asia, and the Americas. But what about the post-colonial era,
from 1945 to the present? It does not necessarily follow that the nowempowered indigenous political cultures of the developing world regard
the ownership of ideas in the same way as their former colonial rulers.
Indeed, some have attitudes toward tangibleproperty that are squarely at

14. Sherwood, supra note 10, at 24.
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odds with the views of Hegel, Locke, and other European political
thinkers.
Many non-European political cultures do not assume an adversarial relationship between individual and society. Islamic and some
African cultures go so far as to define self-identity not according to
individual liberty but according to the individual's relationship with and
contribution to society."5 What exists in many parts of the world is a
non-utilitarian social paradigm in which "right" is not a function of
individual good. Concepts of property are therefore different; if individual liberty is not the basis for self-identity, then the moral foundations of
property must rest somewhere else.
In Ghana and other African countries, many indigenous societies
considered tribal land and other economic resources the property of the
tribe's ancestors. 6 The symbol of this communal ownership was the
stool on which the tribal chief sat; the chief was the personification of the
living generation who had a fiduciary trust for future generations.
Extended families and sometimes individuals could obtain a right of
usufruct for tribal property such as land. A tribe member could then
engage in agriculture and other economic activities that would benefit the
user's extended family in particular and the tribe in general. Returning
benefits to the tribe was the moral rationale behind the right of usufruct.
Intellectual property was not a particularly relevant concept for
the Africans themselves because their traditions had no need for it.
European patent law was introduced in Ghana and the rest of west Africa
at the end of the 19th century largely in the interests of European gold
mining companies." After independence in the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria
and other African countries discarded their inherited British-style patent
laws and adopted new ones based on principles more consistent with
their traditional values and more expedient to development. Nigeria's
patent law, adopted in the 1970s, specifically excludes biological products
and processes from patent protection and further says that other specific
kinds of products can be deemed not patentable by decree in the interest
of society as a whole.'"
In India, the cultural underpinnings of property have been
chaotically shaped by conquest, feudalism, and colonialism. The moghul
invasion of northern India brought with it a wholesale rearrangement of

15. For a concise Islamic perspective, see A. Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam (1979). An
African perspective will be discussed later in this section. Infra notes 16-18.
16. For an excellent description of the history of property rights in Ghana, see S.K.B.
Asante, Property Law and Social Goals in Ghana, 1844-1966 (1975).
17. G. Sipa-Adjah Yankey, International Patents and Technology Transfer to Less
Developed Countries 104-106 (1987).
18. Id. at 210-14.
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land ownership. 9 The Muslim conquerors parceled out land to a system
of feudal military lords who were to provide troops to the emperor if
needed. As the Muslim conquerors were absorbed into the fabric of
Hindu society, the institutions of feudalism were continued by the
zamindars-theprivileged landowners' class. When the British came in the
17th century, they found it expedient to allow the feudal system to
remain largely intact. They consolidated their colonial domination in 1793
by recognizing the legal validity of the zamindars' holdings. Zamindars
were responsible for paying taxes on their land, which was usually being
cultivated and made productive by tenant farmers. At the same time, the
zamindarswere able to call on British forces to enforce their claims against
challenges from outside their class.'
With its traditions of land ownership so broken throughout its
history, India has had to rely on political dialogue to shape its philosophy
of property. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century and up
through independence in 1947, three distinct ideologies struggled against
one another to define the economic relationship between the individual
and the state in India: Western-style market liberalism, advocated by
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel; Soviet-style centrally planned socialism,
advocated by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru; and Mahatma Gandhi's vision of
decentralized village-based social reform. Both Gandhi and Nehru
believed that social reform leading to economic self-sufficiency and the
alleviation of poverty was more important than the individual right of
property, although Gandhi's political methods attempted to co-opt the
propertied classes so that they would voluntarily participate in social
reform.
Patel's political strength after Gandhi's death in 1948 enabled him
to make economic liberalism the guiding philosophy behind the constitution that was drafted in 1949.21 When Patel died in 1950, Nehru attempt-

ed to institute both Gandhian social reforms and socialist economic
planning but found himself constrained by the constitution and the
propertied interests that dominated party politics and the civil service in
many states.
Independent India has never offered strong protection for many
kinds of patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Its rationale has been that
alleviating the country's poverty is more important than any individual's

19. For a discussion of the evolution of intellectual property rights in India, see A.
Gandhi, Right to Property 19-37 (1985).

20. Id.
21. The constitution not only guaranteed the right to "acquire, hold and dispose of
property," it also limited the power of the central government over the state governments.
See F. Frankel, India's Political Economy, 1947-1977, at 77-84 (1978).
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right to derive monopoly rent from an idea.'
Pharmaceuticals in
particular are freely copied in India with the result that medicines are
available for as little as 7 to 20 percent of the cost of comparable drugs
in the United States. Considering that its gross domestic product per
capita in 1991 was $340 compared to $21,000 in the United States, India's
economic incentive to maintain this price difference is substantial.'
Because many of the world's political cultures differ so widely
from European norms, and because concepts of property are shaped by
the political cultures out of which they arise, one cannot assume that
intellectual property laws will or should be the same from one country
to another. Which social goal is to take precedence: rewarding pharmaceutical firms that come up with new medications or distributing the
medications as widely as possible by keeping the prices low? Is it more
important to reward biotechnology firms for developing high-yield
varieties of crops and hardy livestock or to maximize the nation's
agricultural productivity by enabling farmers to obtain the new seed and
animal varieties as cheaply as possible? The way a country chooses to
balance these conflicting goals is reflected in its domestic patent regime.
Different political cultures make different choices, and sometimes there
is no unanimity even among industrially advanced countries. Table 1 lists
the countries that exclude pharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical processes, and
plant and animal varieties (for the most part, new strains of livestock and
crops) from patent protection.
The relevant point is not that the European philosophy of
intellectual property is correct and everyone else in the world is
wrong--or vice versa. What the foregoing discussion shows is more
basic: that there are many different historic and cultural assumptions
about the ownership of ideas. Were it not for trade, international law
would be unconcerned with so many different national regimes for
intellectual property because each would be strictly a matter of domestic
policy. But the fact is that nations do trade, so the differences matter.
Fair participation in the global market depends on rules that bind
each nation equally, otherwise market distortions will place some nations
at a disadvantage. If the European individual-rights philosophy were to
be the international norm for intellectual property rights, many pharmaceuticals and other new products would not be widely dispersed in the
world's poorest countries where a great need for those products exists.
On the other hand, if the socially oriented philosophy of many nonEuropean cultures were the norm, then inventors (primarily European
and American firms) would be deprived of some amount of compensa-

22. Id.
23. World Bank, World Tables 1991 (1992).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

tion for their research and development. The choice may be distilled to
an even more basic level: should individual rights or social well-being be
the basic principle behind an international regime of intellectual
property?
Regardless of whether the forum is domestic or global, the choice
between individual rights and social welfare is irreconcilable. One may
glibly say that protecting individual rights always leads to the highest
social welfare, but only if one trusts in some metaphysical hokus-pokus
supposedly inherent in the market that magically directs a chaotic mass
of individuals to an inevitably harmonious outcome. Not only is such
reasoning ingenuous, it avoids the basic question. Even though the
exercise of individual rights might not compromise the common good all
the time, eventually the two will come into conflict, and when that
happens, one must have priority over the other in order for a decision to
be taken. The choice made by each political culture would have domestic
legitimacy, but in no case would the moral foundations of the choice be
so compelling as to render another political culture's decision illegitimate.
That would require invalidating an entire set of social assumptions about
what is right and what is good, which would be morally possible only if
there were a shared body of higher principles by which such a judgment
could be made. Lacking any relevant supracultural criteria, it is virtually
impossible to resolve the question of whose domestic values "should"
prevail in an international regime.
Disagreements between nations are more often resolved on the
basis of "can" rather than "should," however.'
The rule of law is
absent unless and until the countries in question agree by treaty to abide
by a certain set of principles. 5 Even so, advanced industrial countries
can wield enormous economic or military power to decide issues in their
favor in spite of international law.'
But the blade cuts the other way, too. At various times throughout the 20th century, developing countries such as Mexico, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and Chile nationalized the holdings of multinational firms
pumping oil or mining minerals within their borders. Usually the

24. This is why advocates of the European view are on less than solid ground when they
contend that protecting individual rights is the best way to ensure economic prosperity and,
ultimately, social welfare. European colonial interests could overpower indigenous cultures
in the New World, and they did. Thus history does not resolve the question of whether the
chain of causation leads from individual rights to social welfare or vice versa.
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, art. 34, 8 I.L.M. 679.
26. The quintessential example is the U.S. decision to ignore a ruling by the International
Court of Justice that U.S. mining of Nicaraguan harbors was illegal. Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and&Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26); Dep't St. Bull., No. 2096, Mar.
1985, at 64.
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industrially advanced countries had no choice but to acquiesce to
nationalization because of the political and logistical difficulty of taking
any retaliatory measures. As former United States Secretary of State Dean
Acheson characterized Saudi Arabia's nationalization of United States oil
companies' facilities and equipment shortly after World War 'I, the
United States determined that its interests were best served by "graciously granting what it no longer had the power to withhold."'
When sanctioned or encouraged by a government, the piracy of
intellectual property obtained through trade with other countries is
analogous to nationalization of foreign assets. The difference is that
instead of tangible property such as oil field equipment or copper mines,
the value being taken is monopoly rent created by a patent or copyright.
The rent that would have been repatriated to the foreign inventor had the
patent or copyright been protected is instead kept in the economy of the
pirating country. Domestic patent royalties are similarly affected.
The factors that make intellectual property nationalization
possible are virtually the same as those that make other kinds of
nationalization possible. Only a sovereign government can create the
administrative infrastructure necessary to enforce an intellectual property
regime. If the government deliberately chooses not to do so, there is little
any outside government can do. Even trade sanctions might cost the
industrially advanced countries more than their affected industries would
lose in patent rent.
Nationalizing tangible foreign property such as oil rigs has the
immediate effect of adding to a country's domestic capital stock without
any national savings having been invested. The net capital stock increases
by government fiat, thus freeing a certain portion of national savings for
investment in other productive processes elsewhere in the domestic
economy. Like capital equipment, a patented idea is an input to a
productive process, and the rent created by a patent constitutes a specific
bundle of value that is normally part of the final price. By not protecting
a foreign patent, however, the bundle of value that constituted the
patent's monopoly rent does not show up in the final price; it stays in the
pockets of consumers and thereby adds to the net wealth in the domestic
economy. Nationalized monopoly rents, by taking the form of lower
consumer prices, thus result in a net increase in social benefit in the
economy without any domestic savings having been used. The increased
social benefit is essentially the same as what results from nationalizing
foreign-owned capital equipment: an increase in productive capacity-or

27. D. Acheson, Present at the Creation 505 (1969).
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similarly, a reduction in production costs--that otherwise would have
been stimulated only by the investment of domestic savings. 2
The real policy' question, therefore, is whether a developing
country can get away with pirating intellectual property-or, to turn the
question around, whether rich industrial countries can force poor
countries to pay monopoly prices for goods protected by patent and
copyright laws that exist in the rich countries but not in the poor ones.
Moral arguments are inconclusive, so policy will largely be determined
by who has the strongest economic leverage: the pirating country, or the
country seeking to extract the monopoly rent offered by intellectual
property protection.
Economic Effects
The Biodiversity Convention raises two types of economic issues:
the effect on the economy of a developing country of monopoly rent
created by a patent, and the need to pay for environmental costs that are
external to normal market forces.
29
Strictly speaking, rent is "payment for the use of a resource."
The rent for labor is wages; for capital, it is interest. For ideas and
innovations, rent takes the form of royalties on patents or copyrights.
When patents are protected, the royalties create monopoly rent that will
last until the expiration of the patent or until the development of slightly
modified imitations and alternatives.
Because competitors are barred from entering the market,' the
monopolist need not set prices and output levels according to market
demand. If the goal is to maximize profit, the monopolist instead will
choose a level of output such that marginal revenue is equal to marginal
cost of production. 3' Figure 1 shows the effect: the profit-maximizing

28. The economic rationale for this argument is explained in the next section of this
article. Infra notes 29-38.
29. The difference between rent and profit is often obscure. Sometimes the two terms are
used interchangeably, while other economists equate profit with interest on capital. The
New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 3 at 1014-1018 and vol. 4 at 141 U. Eatwell
et al. eds., 1987). In any case, for the present purpose it will serve to leave the discussion
of profits to one side and consider patent royalties as rent-that is, the cost of using an idea
or innovation.
30. Barriers to entry may be due to prohibitive start-up costs, or they may be established
by the state.
31. This means that the cost of producing one more unit of output is the same as the
revenue that will come from that additional unit, thereby making the additional increment
of profit zero. Beyond this point, additional output will yield revenues less than the
additional cost, so total profits will diminish.
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monopolist will reduce output to q*, prices will go up, and the surplus
benefit to consumers will decrease.'
The rationale for creating monopoly rent is that the firm may
have necessary expenses that are in addition to the typical opportunity
costs of capital and labor it has to pay to produce a certain level of
output. Research and development, for example, often involve spending
money on many research failures prior to the discovery of a marketable
new product. The resources spent on the failures do not increase the
firm's output nor do they add to productivity, yet they are an unavoidable part of the risk involved in research and development. The idea is
that the monopoly rent created by a patent will compensate the firm for
these nonproductive expenses.
On the other hand, monopoly rent also creates a net welfare loss
to consumers.' In deciding its intellectual property regime, the state
has to decide whether the benefit of creating rents from royalties
adequately offsets the loss to consumers.
The magnitude of the social loss may affect the diligence with
which a country protects intellectual property through domestic policies.
A government will have an incentive to encourage piracy of productive
foreign technology if its people are too poor to pay the "legitimate" price
and if it has no indigenous expertise to develop similar competing
technologies of its own. Table 2 compares the prices of selected drugs in
the United States (which protects pharmaceutical patents) with prices of
the same drugs in India (which does not). Patent rent accounts for much
of the difference.
On the other side of the debate, patent holders often incur
significant costs in bringing their new products to market. The United
States pharmaceutical industry says it spent 16 percent of its total sales
in 1991 on research and development-nearly $10 billion out of $60
billion in sales.' Money for research and development comes from the
higher prices made possible by product and process patents; this rent
makes up a large part of the industry's total sales. The industry estimates
that about 60 percent of the drugs on the market now never would have

32. Consumer surplus is the total benefit consumers enjoy from a good minus what they
pay in order to get it.
33. This loss may be understood as the additional benefit society would have gotten had
prices been lower and output higher, up to the point at which the price would have been
equal to the marginal cost of production. In the figure, the rectangle below the consumers'
welfare loss represents unused resources that can still be employed elsewhere. Conservation
of these resources is not considered a loss.
34. Intellectual Property Rights Protection under Special 301: Hearings on S. 722 Before

the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1992)
37 (1992) [hereinafter Special 301 Hearing).
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been developed had firms not been able to recoup their expenses through
patent rent.35
The United States International Trade Commission and the
United States Trade Representative's office estimate that patent piracy
cost United States pharmaceutical makers about $5 billion in lost sales
worldwide in 1991, or 8 to 9 percent of total sales.' The industry
estimates that losses from India alone costs its members about $200
million a year in lost sales.37 But this may be overestimating the loss.
Recalling the two basic facts that patented drugs cost significantly more
than pirated drugs (as shown in table 2) and that demand falls as prices
increase (figure 1), it is possible that multinational pharmaceutical firms
would realize little or no new sales in a developing country that adopted
new patent protection policies. Only the richest in these low-income
countries would be able to afford the drugs at patent-protected prices.
Everyone else would have to do without. In the worst-case scenario, the
only significant welfare change would take place in the developing
country: the poor would buy fewer medications.
The incentive for pharmaceutical techno-piracy in a developing
country is great because the patent accounts for a large portion of the
price, and because including the patent rent in the price would prevent
a large number of people from acquiring medications for which a
demand exists.m International trade adds another significant reason: little
if any of the monopoly rent from the patent would be transferred to the
economy of the pirating country if patents were protected. It would all
be repatriated to the country of manufacture, depleting foreign exchange
reserves and possibly adding to the country's debt burden.
In addition to the controversy over patents, the Biodiversity
Convention also raises the issue of who pays for environmental protection. Policy interventions to encourage pollution abatement typically
attempt to change the economics of production decisions. The ideal
hypothetical policy is to tax emissions and waste discharges equal to the
marginal damage of the polluting activity. 9 The external costs, which
might include increased illness, aesthetic loss, damage to recreation, and
other nonmarket effects, would be estimated by a regulatory agency that
would then set the tax rate. Most policies attempt to achieve this ideal
35. Id.
36. Id. at 35-36.
37. Id. at 37.
38. For more on the effects of patent protection on technology importing countries, see
A. Subramian, The InternationalEconomics of Intellectual Property Right Protection:A WelfareTheoretic Trade Policy Analysis, 19 World Dev. 945 (1991).
39. For a textbook discussion, see W. Baumol & W. Oates, The Theory of Environmental
Policy 14-35 (1988). For a comprehensive review of the literature, see M. Cropper & W.
Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. Econ. Lit. 675 (1992).
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either through market incentives, permits, performance requirements, or
a combination of approaches. By "internalizing" external environmental
effects by taxes, fines, or subsidies, firms will have an incentive to invest
in pollution control technologies.
Protecting pristine ecosystems requires a similar effort. The
difference is that instead of paying for pollution abatement, society has
to give up alternative uses of areas that are to be conserved. People living
near the preserved wilderness area, rain forest, or wetland may need the
land for cultivation, or they may need its trees for firewood and shelter.
They may need to cut ground vegetation for livestock fodder, or they
may need to dam a river to produce hydroelectricity. Protecting the
ecosystem may require prohibiting all these activities, which would
involve some additional cost to society as alternatives were sought.
The social costs of conserving an ecosystem present two
problems. First, the nearest cost that would be "counted" by the market
price of biotechnology products would be the Sccounting cost of hiring
labor to harvest and process the raw material. In effect, the habitat from
which biota are taken is treated as a public good when in fact it is not.
In other words, the implicit economic assumptions are that anyone can
use the ecosystem, and that one person's use does not preclude any
other's use. But. land--especially land that is potentially arable-by its
very nature can never be a true public good.' Once a tract is put to one
use or conserved, all other alternative uses are precluded.
The second problem, related to the first, is the definition of
"society." Normally, microeconomic players include those who produce
economic goods and those who consume them. If society is defined only
as producers and consumers, then the costs borne by people near the
preserved area will not be taken into account. The problem is especially
acute when the pristine ecosystem is in a developing country, and both
producers and consumers are in industrially advanced countries.
To equitably account for all costs, the conceptual boundaries of
society must be expanded to include the people who could have used the
preserved area for more farmland, timber, or some other local purpose.
Costs which otherwise would have been ignored must then be incorporated somehow into the product price, as happens with pollution
abatement. The additional revenue could then be used to compensate
residents near the preserved area for doing without whatever it. is they
would have otherwise done with the land.
What the foregoing analysis shows is that with biodiversity
technology patents, (a) a sizable monopoly rent would be created for the

40. Land can be a common good if its use is non-competitive, as in the case of a national
park that is open to everyone. It is a private good if its use is competitive and exclusive.
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patent holder, (b) the rent normally would not find its way to those who
bear the social costs of preserving the ecosystem that makes the
technology economically viable, and (c) developing countries would have
a strong economic incentive to ignore the patents and pirate the
technologies. A middle path does suggest itself amid, these three
conflicting points, one that might have been apparent to the negotiators
of the Biodiversity Convention had they taken a more studied approach
to the issue of intellectual property rights.
The next section takes a closer look at how the treaty does address
intellectual property rights. The key points of the previous two sections
(the absence of any compelling moral argument for either side and the
strength of the economic incentives in developing countries to nationalize
patent rent) will illuminate how inadequately the Biodiversity Convention
addresses this crucial issue.
The Biodiversity Convention and Intellectual PropertyRights
Article 16 of the Biodiversity Convention says that
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other
intellectual property rights may have an influence on the
implementation of this Convention, shall cooperate in this
regard subject to national legislation and international law in
order to ensure that such rights are supportiveof and do not run
counter to its objectives.4'
The reference to "national legislation and international law" in
regard to intellectual property rights raises a nettlesome question: which
set of international laws? Currently a system of international principles
is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
a United Nations-affiliated body charged with facilitating compliance
with a system of bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions on
intellectual property rights. The principles that have been incorporated
within the WIPO regime are generally consistent with the national patent
laws of developing countries.42
The WIPO treaties, 3 which include the Paris Convention on
41. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, at art. 16, para. 5 [emphasis added].
42. GATT or WIPO: New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property 224
(F. Beier & G. Schricker eds., 1989) [hereinafter GAT or WIPO.
43. Among the agreements administered by WIPO are the 1883 Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, 1967 Stockholm Revisions, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971 Paris Revisions, 216
U.N.T.S. 133; the Madrid Agreement on Marks, WIPO doc. 260; the Madrid Agreement for
the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods, 828 U.N.T.S. 162; the
Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International
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patents, the Berne Convention on copyrights, and a number of other
specialized instruments, gives member states significant latitude in
excluding products and processes from patentability. Pharmaceutical
products and processes, plant and animal varieties as well as biological
processes for producing them, medical treatments for humans or animals,
food products, chemical products, computer programs, fertilizers,
agricultural machines, cosmetics, and nuclear inventions are among the
items that various countries are entitled to exclude from patentability
under the Paris Convention." The excluded items can thus be easily
copied and widely distributed without regard to royalty payments to the
inventor. The WIPO regime also recognizes the right of a country to
impose compulsory licensing to ensure that patented products and
processes are made available to the public.' Developing countries often
rely on patent exclusions and compulsory licensing to ensure the
dissemination of new technologies in their domestic economies.
The United States has not ratified a number of WIPO instruments,
nor have some members of the European Community.* The industrially advanced countries favor an intellectual property regime through the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Such a regime would
have more "teeth" than WIPO because it would provide the basis for a
technology-exporting country to impose trade sanctions against a
technology-importing country if the latter fails to protect the patent rights
of the former's nationals.47
Registration, revised 1969, WIPO doc. 264; the Rome Convention on Broadcasting, 496
U.N.T.S. 43; and the Phonograms Convention, WIPO doc. no. 288.
44. World Intellectual Property Organization, Existence, Scope and Form of Generally
Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Document
Prepared by the International Bureau of WIPO, WIPO-Doc. WO/INF/29 (Sept. 1988), at pt. I

§1.
45. Compulsory licensing laws require firms with patents to grant licenses to domestic
franchises if the patented processes are interdependent with other processes, or if the
government deems that it is in the public interest for a larger number of firms to work the
patents. Other countries have laws which allow the state to appropriate patents for its own
use without the consent of the patent holder. Both of these principles are incorporated in
WIPO documents and model laws. Id. at pt. I § 7.
46. In 1988, the United States was party only to the Paris Convention, the Patent
Cooperation Treaty, and the Phonograms Convention. Neither Germany nor France were
party to the Lisbon Agreement. The United Kingdom was not party to the Madrid
Agreement on Marks or the Lisbon Agreement. Japan was not party to the Madrid
111,
at Annexes 1,
Agreement on Marks, the Lisbon Agreement, or the Rome Convention. Id.
VII-Xiv.
47. By comparison, international disputes mechanisms within the eiisting WIPO regime
are weak and difficult to invoke. The International Court of Justice has competence to
adjudicate official disagreements over intellectual pi-operty protection between some-but
not all-WIPO member states. Yet many experts believe it is unlikely that a state would ever
take a patent dispute to the court. GATT or WIPO, supra note 42, at 35, 227.
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Perhaps the most significant features of a GATT regime would
be the standards of national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment.
That is, domestic laws would not treat foreign nationals any differently
than domestic interests, and each country would extend favorable
treatment to all other countries equally. GATT proponents believe that
international standards based on these two principles would reduce the
chance that domestic policies regarding intellectual property protection
could be used as disguised barriers to trade. Developing countries, on the
other hand, generally favor the principle of reciprocity, by which a
country would afford foreign nationals treatment similar to that enjoyed
by its own nationals in other countries on a case-by-case basis. Unlike the
national treatment and most-favored-nation principles, reciprocity allows
for wide variations between domestic patent regimes, which tends either
to reduce trade or encourage weaker domestic patent laws in all trading
countries. Such a variation would favor technology-importing countries
who afford even their own domestic firms little patent protection. Many
developing countries are opposed to a GATT-based regime because they
fear it will limit their access to new technology, increase the leverage of
multinational corporations, and raise domestic consumer prices.48
The main problem with the GAiT approach to intellectual
property rights is that no principles have actually been adopted. A draft
of new amendments to the GATT includes an annex that sets forth
principles on the trade-related aspects of intellectual property.49 The
annex attempts to strike a compromise between the interests of industrial
and developing countries, but strong objections have been raised on
virtually all sides.0 The draft principles would permit parties to exclude
from patentability "plants and animals other than microorganisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals
other than non-biological and microbiological processes."5' A partial
concession to developing countries with agriculturally based economies,
this provision does not extend to pharmaceuticals or other processes that

48. For a polemic discussion of intellectual property issues in current world trade talks
from the perspective of developing countries, see C. Raghavan, Recolonization: GATT, the
Uruguay Round and the Third World 114-141 (1990).
49. The draft was written by GAIT Director General Arthur Dunkel in an attempt to
consolidate what he believed to be the issues on which some working consensus had been
reached, separate from the yet-unresolved issues of agricultural subsidies and trade in
services. Trade-related intellectual property standards (TRIPS) are dealt with in Annex III.
FinalAct Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT
Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter "Dunkel Text"].
50. A number of GATT officials observed that the 1992 draft "satisfied virtually no one
but was probably the best compromise that could be obtained." World Intellectual Property
Report, Feb. 1992, at 41.
51. Dunkel Text, supra note 49, at Annex III, art. 27, para. 3(b).
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may use natural plant and animal species as inputs. The proposed
revisions thus do not go as far as developing countries would like. Even
so, United States pharmaceutical firms are concerned about the
weakening of United States laws that provide for trade sanctions against
countries that do not protect United States patents, and they object to a
provision that would allow developing countries a 10-year grace period
before having to comply with the new GATT norms. 2 On the other
hand, the draft would limit the use of compulsory licensing and would
limit a government's ability to take a product or process without the
authorization of the patent holder.5
Adoption of the proposed GATT principles on the trade-related
aspects of intellectual property would create a situation in which many
domestic laws differ from GATT norms yet are consistent with the WIPO
regime.'M Developing countries in general would have broader compulsory licensing laws and would exclude a wider range of products and
processes from patentability than would be allowed under the draft
GATT principles. Industrial countries-the United States in particular-would probably find it more difficult to use trade sanctions to
retaliate against widespread infringement of patents and copyrights
abroad. Even though GATT dispute resolution procedures are relatively
transparent, nondiscriminatory, and permit effective trade sanctions,
United States lawmakers are especially troubled by the prospects of
letting a GATT arbitration panel decide whether United States retaliation
is justified. According to Senator Max Baucus, chairman of the United
States Senate's subcommittee on international trade, "The reality is that
we may have no alternative but to win intellectual property protection
country-by-country." ss
In short, the call for cooperation in protecting intellectual
property "subject to national legislation and international law" in Article
16 of the Biodiversity Convention invokes either (a) a weak WIPO regime
or (b) a contentious and yet-unratified GATT regime that would attempt
to curb practices by developing countries that are now permissible under
WIPO. The first case resolves to a de facto null regime that would
represent little actual change in intellectual property protection. The
world would be no worse off than before, but the cause of biological
diversity would not be furthered in any way. The second case would lead
to serious contradictions between GATT and WIPO, and between GATT

52. Special 301 Hearing, supra note 34.

art. 31.
53. Dunkel Text, supra note 49, at Annex III,
54. Final adoption of the draft GATT principles on intellectual property depends on the
successful conclusion of the current round of global trade negotiations, which as of this
writing was uncertain.
55. Special 301 Hearing, supra note 34, at 4.
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norms and domestic patent laws in many developing countries. Although
the WIPO regime would still be in force and could be invoked by
developing countries, the power of trade sanctions would lie with the
GATT regime, which has yet to come to terms with the environmental
effects of trade.'
Another problem with the above provision in Article 16 is
contained in the phrase that calls for the parties to ensure that principles
of intellectual property rights (whichever system one may use to define
them) "are supportive of and do not run counter to [the Biodiversity
Convention's] objectives." In other words, if there is any conflict between
protection of intellectual property rights and the objectives of the treaty,
then intellectual property rights must give way. One may argue
persuasively that the ecological objective of biological diversity should
indeed take precedence over intellectual property rights. But the treaty
also aims to achieve an economic goal: the "fair and equitable sharing of
the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources."' 7 Even
though the ecological and the economic goals both may be worthy, the
two are different in nature and provide different contexts for weighing
the social need to protect intellectual property rights.
The public trust doctrine provides a rationale and legal precedent
for placing ecological protection above private property rights.5 But
customary law does not support a similar canonical ordering between the
redistributionof wealth and private property rights. If one is to infer such
a link, it must be done on the basis of economic theory and not on the
basis of customary law. And if one looks to neoclassical economics for a
heuristic to determine how to achieve the "fair and equitable sharing" of
benefits, the answer provided by theory is straightforward: let the
concerned parties negotiate on the basis of their willingness to pay, and
the market will reach an outcome that will be fair and equitable.' No
56. Supra note 7.
57. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1. The reference to rights over
technologies is essentially meaningless in the absence of mutually recognized principles
defining those rights.
58. Courts have repeatedly invoked this doctrine to affirm "the duty of the state to protect
the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that
right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with
the purposes of the trust." National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658
P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). See also Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d
1085 (Idaho 1983) and Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
59. This is a restatement of what has come to be known as Coase's Theorem, first put
forward by Nobel laureate economist Ronald Coase in 1960: "It is always possible to modify
by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such
market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it
would lead to an increase in the value of production." R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
J.L & Econ. (1960).
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legislative, administrative, or policy measures by a government would be
necessary other than to minimize transaction costs.
Many economists outside the neoclassical school, however, have
advanced equally cogent theories that explain how equity between
trading nations can in fact diminish over time if market forces are left to
themselves. Economists of the dependency school, a group largely
identified with developing countries, argue that the path of successive
market equilibria creates structural imbalances that leave developing
countries at an unfair disadvantage in the international trading system.'
The structural disadvantage would necessarily increase over time if
market forces were to continue unchecked by positive trade policies by
both industrial and developing countries.
The details of the economic debate are not directly pertinent here.
The issue at hand is how the redistributive issue resolves under the
Biodiversity Convention. Lacking any precedent in customary law and
lacking any unequivocal basis in economic theory, no compelling
justification exists for rearranging intellectual property rights for the
purpose of redistributing income. Even if one were to argue the
environmental benefits of income redistribution, one would still have to
leave the safe harbor of the public trust doctrine for the murky waters of
a still-nascent economic theory of sustainable development. Foreign aid
programs and contractual trade preferences may be in order and are
certainly not excluded, but that is not the same as establishing a legal
entitlement that would permit the rearrangement of intellectual property
rights without the consent of those who hold those rights.
What the Biodiversity Convention does, therefore, is to mistakenly aggregate two fundamentally different principles that could potentially
affect intellectual property: a party is required to accept a questionable
goal of income redistribution along with the legally supportable
ecological goal of maintaining biological diversity. One thus sees the logic
behind the Clinton Administration's decision to ratify the Biodiversity
Convention while at the same time attaching an interpretive statement
that drives a wedge between these two different objectives. The current
United States position clearly sees biodiversity and income redistribution
as separable issues, and that while the former would unequivocally
justify the rearrangement of private property rights if it were at stake, the

60. R. Prebisch, for example, says that a country's capacity to industrialize is affected by
imbalances in that country's terms of trade. Developing countries find themselves exporting
mostly cheap labor-intensive primary goods and importing most of their expensive capitalintensive manufactures. The path of successive market equilibria over time therefore
increases a developing country's dependence on the advanced industrial countries for
needed capital goods. R. Prebisch, Five Stages in My Thinking on Development, in Pioneers in
Development (G. Meier & D. Seers eds., 1984).
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latter depends on case-by-case consent between governments and
between the public and private. sectors.6
A less-critical problem with the Biodiversity Convention's
treatment of intellectual property rights is that the role of the private sector
is obscured. Article 16 generally considers technology patents as privileges
granted by the state, and as such, the state has the right to direct the
distribution of patented technologies that are held by individuals and firms
in its private sector. Paragraph 3 states that
Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or
policy measures, as appropriate, with the aim that Contracting
Parties, in particular those that are developing countries, which
provide genetic resources are provided access to and transfer of
technology which makes use of those resources, on mutually
agreed terms, including technology protected by patents and
other intellectual property rights .... 62
Here, "mutually agreed terms" refers to deals between governments. The role of private firms and individuals who hold the relevant
patents is clarified in the next paragraph:
Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or
policy measures, as appropriate, with the aim thatthe private
sector facilitates access to, joint development and transfer of
[biotechnology] for the benefit of both governmental institutions
and the private sector of developing countries .... 63
To a market-oriented government, appropriate measures might
extend only so far as sponsoring industry conferences on biotechnology
transfer to developing countries. A socialist or statist government could
conceivably adopt a broader interpretation: compelling a patent holder to
license the product or process to the state with the purpose of making it
available to a developing country." Recalling the previous discussion

61. Supra note 3
62. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, at art. 16, para. 3.
63. Id. at para. 4. Paragraph 2 of this article states that "[iln the case of technology subject
to patents and other intellectual property rights, such access and transfer shall be provided
on terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights." It further says, however, that the parties must treat intellectual
property rights in a way consistent with the two paragraphs cited here and with paragraph
5. Id. at para. 5. One may discern throughout article 16 the philosophical tension between
industrial and developing countries discussed earlier in this paper.
64. This would be an application of compulsory licensing, which is not only current
practice in many developing countries but is also allowed under the Paris Convention. Supra
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about how different political cultures regard intellectual property, one can
see how legitimate interpretations of these two paragraphs could vary so
widely that the provisions would have no real effect at all.
The ambiguity with which the Biodiversity Convention deals with
the private sector in Article 16 is somewhat offset by Article 10, in which
the contracting parties pledge to cooperate with the private sector in
"developing methods for sustainable use of biological resources."' A
cooperative agreement between a country and a firm that wants access to
that country's biological resources can do what the Biodiversity Convention currently does not do: (a) recognize that the immediate payoff from
biological resources depends on the rent the derived products obtain in the
world market and (b) ensure that the country supplying the resources gets
a proportional share of that rent.
An example of such cooperation that pre-dates the Biodiversity
Convention by about a year is the agreement between Costa Rica and
Merck & Co., the world's largest pharmaceutical manufacturer. In this
agreement, Merck paid Costa Rica's Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad
(INBio) $1 million in cash and $180,000 in equipment for a two-year
exclusive right to research and develop pharmaceuticals and agricultural
products from biological samples supplied to Merck by the institute. In
addition, Merck has trained numerous Costa Rican technical personnel. If
any marketable products are obtained from the biological specimens it
provides, Costa Rica will get a share of the royalties.'
Costa Rican officials say that, so far, the agreement has been
satisfactory.67 The $1 million provided by Merck is equivalent to more
than half of the Costa Rican institute's $1.8 million 1993 annual operating
budget, and the cash has facilitated efforts to catalogue the many plant and
animal species in the country's rain forests and protected areas.
Ironically, the agreement between Costa Rica and Merck underscores the dilemma in which the Biodiversity Convention leaves developing countries. One aim put forward by developing countries themselves
was to establish a precedent of using some of the revenues from pharmaceuticals and other products made with biota originating in their pristine
ecosystems to offset the social costs of preserving rain forests, wetlands,

note 44, at pt. I § 7.
65. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10, para. (e).
66. Communications from K. Colgan, Manager of Media Relations, Merck & Co. (Sept.
20, 1993), and N. Martin, Biodiversity Prospecting Field Manager, Instituto Nacional
Biodiversidad (Oct. 5, 1993), to the author (on file with author). Neither Merck nor INBio
would specify a figure for the royalties, but Martin said that typical royalties in agreements
of this nature range from 1 percent to 5 percent of net sales.
67. Telephone interview with A. Sittenfeld, Director of Biodiversity Prospecting, INBio
(Oct. 4, 1993).
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and wilderness areas. Any such payment, however, would have to come
from the same rent developing countries are not inclined to protect. Instead,
developing countries sought direct financial transfers from industrial
countries' while at the same time seeking to preserve a regime of weak
intellectual property protection.
Biological diversity, the fair sharing of economic benefits, the fair
protection of intellectual property rights, and free trade are not irreconcilable despite the complexity of the issues. The real tragedy in this story,
however, is not the harm to intellectual property rights but rather the
missed opportunity to further the ecological goal of biological diversity.
The economic forces that make intellectual property so controversial a trade
issue can be used as a potent tool to promote the diversity of species, but
the treaty as it stands fails to do that. Had it followed the precedent of the
ozone protection treaties, 9 the Convention on Biological Diversity would
have identified intellectual property rights as an issue to be researched by
a special working group that would recommend a specific protocol at the
next meeting of the parties. Such a protocol is still feasible; the next section
sketches what it might look like.
A Protocolfor ProductsMade with Biotafrom PristineEcosystems
The international community needs to develop and accept a special
new category of intellectual property principles for products made with
biota from pristine ecosystems," Such patents should be treated differently from normal patents on commercial products and processes, and should
take account of the special situation and needs of developing countries."
Although other issues could be addressed, the four main points of
the proposed protocol would be as follows.
1. All contracting parties-richand poor-must agree to protect the
patentsof technologiesfor pharmaceuticalsandotherproductsmade from the biota
68. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 20-21.
69. See the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516
(1987), and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987, 26

I.L.M. 1541.
70. For a precedent, one may look to the 1989 treaty on integrated circuits, which created
a new category of intellectual property to cover the topography of integrated circuits. Treaty

on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1484.
71. The Generalized System of Preferences, which evolved out of negotiations within the

UN Conference on Trade and Development from 1964 to 1971, established a precedent for
giving developing countries preferential tariff treatment on a nondiscriminatory basis.
UNCTAD, Review of the Schemes of Generalized Preferences,TD/B/C, 5/9,1973, and TD/B/C,
5/22.1974. See alsoB. SWdersten, International Economics 243-58 (2d ed., 1980). The Montreal
Protocol includes special provisions for developing countries. Montreal Protocol, supra note
68, at art. 5.
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of pristine ecosystems in developing countries. The provisions of this article
would apply only to those particular products that arise from national
efforts to preserve biological diversity. Patents that use genetically
engineered species or common species not protected by a conservation
program would be excluded from this provision; protection of those patents
would be left to WIPO and the GAT. The patents covered in this protocol
would be protected according to the standards of national treatment and
most-favored-nation treatment. In other words, all parties would be
required to protect this class of product equally, regardless of whether the
biota were taken from their own protected areas or those of another party.
Conceivably, trade sanctions could be legally used against a
contracting party that did not uphold its commitment to protect these
patents. The parties may choose to establish enforcement and dispute
resolution procedures in the protocol, but these matters could be adequately handled under the GATT72 In fact, the acceptance of this protocol
would provide GATT parties and dispute arbitration panels with a clear
and welcome decisionmaking rule.
The legal scope of this provision would depend on the depth of
consensus behind it. Initially, the rule would bind only those countries that
were contracting parties to the biodiversity technology protocol. A country
not party to the protocol could allow piracy of the relevant technologies
and conceivably get away with it. If, on the other hand, a large number of
countries accede-including an overwhelming number of developing
countries-then it may be possible to interpret this provision as a principle
of international law applicable to all countries regardless of whether they
ratify the protocol themselves. 3
2. A share of the revenues from the sale of pharmaceuticalsand other
products made from the biota of pristineecosystems in developing countries must
be returned to the countries from which the biota are taken. If developing
countries are to be required to guarantee the monopoly rent included in the
price of products made from their biota, then equity requires that they
receive a share of that rent. Such a transfer would substantially support the
objective of "fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the
utilization of genetic resources." 7'

72. This assumes disputes would be between parties who are also parties to the GATT.
73. D. Hurlbut, Beyond the Montreal P'rotocol: Effects on Non-Party Developing Countries and
Future Environmental Treaties, 4 Colo. J. Int'l Env. L. & Pol'y 344. See also D. Arrow, Seabeds,
Sovereignty and Objective Regimes, 7 Fordham Int'l L.J. 169, 209 (1984).
74. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.
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Not only would developing countries receive a share of the
economic benefits, market dynamics would become part of the effort to
protect biological diversity. Countries with rain forests, wetlands, and
wilderness areas that contain the largest diversity of plant and animal
species would be at a comparative advantage; there would be a greater
probability of developing profitable products from their biota. The more
successful the product and the greater the revenue stream, the greater the
payoff would be to the country from which the biota were taken.
The resource transfer to developing countries would be openended. That is, it would last as long as there was a demand for the
products. This fits neatly with the open-ended nature of resource transfers
called for in the Biodiversity Convention. Open-ended transfers are tenable
as a share of a given product's revenue stream. They are not tenable as
official direct assistance, which the Biodiversity Convention now calls for.
Official aid introduces the possibility of sovereignty disputes-the
questionable right of a developing country to claim part of an industrially
advanced country's tax revenues, and the questionable right of the latter to
attach "strings" to the aid it gives.
With patent protection assured by the previous article, the private
sector would have a role that would be both voluntary and competitive.
The protocol therefore should not attempt to determine the host developing
country's share of royalties, because in any given case competition between
bidding firms could increase what the country could get. A minimum
royalty share could be established as a benchmark, but setting the level too
high might result in some countries losing deals they otherwise would have
had.
3. The contracting parties must establish a multilateral fund to help
developing countriesacquireand distributelife-saving pharmaceuticalsmade from
the biota of pristine ecosystems. An annex would list the kinds of drugs to be
covered by the fund: heart medications, malaria medications, and
inoculations against HIV, to name a few possibilities. The annex would
include both existing specific drugs and those types of drugs that may be
developed in the future. Criteria for the scheduled drugs would be agreed
upon by the contracting parties, and could include yardsticks such as
efficacy of treatment, communicability of disease, or elasticity of demand.
For the fund to work, the contributions of industrially advanced
parties cannot be voluntary as is the case now. The Montreal Protocol
assesses contracting parties on a scale based on countries' general financial
obligations to the United Nations, a formula that would be easily adapted
to a biodiversity technology protocol. Unlike the revenues derived from
product sales addressed in the previous section, however, the multilateral
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fund would not be open-ended. It would be identifiably limited to the
products listed in the annex, which would require developing countries to
ration their demands under the fund. Yet it would not preclude or
prejudice efforts by developing countries in obtaining aid from other
sources for the same purposes.
The multilateral fund would significantly strengthen the legitimacy
and impact of the Biodiversity Convention by recognizing the special
situation of developing countries in a clear, meaningful way. The treaty
already asserts this distinction.
4. The obligation of contracting parties to protect patent rights for
technologies to make products from the biota of pristine ecosystems must be
without prejudice to any kind of intellectual propertynot covered by the biodiversity technology protocol.It is not the purpose of the Biodiversity Convention
to resolve the long-running controversy over international protection of
intellectual property. Different issues are involved here-issues that are
more time-sensitive than purely trade issues. These issues are such that
they provide a rationale for recognizing the special situation of developing
countries. The broader disagreement over the trade-related aspects of
intellectual property should not be allowed to delay agreement on the
narrower category of patents covered by a biodiversity technology protocol.
Because the Biodiversity Convention is in the form of a framework
convention, it is anticipated that the details of the regime would evolve as
scientific knowledge, cooperation, and institutions evolve. The treaty calls
for the parties to meet regularly so that the agreement's specific measures
can be reviewed and renegotiated as circumstances change.' Issues such
as monitoring, enforcement, criteria for defining developing country
parties, and a minimum share of royalties that should go to the developing
country providing the plant and animal species are all items that would be
negotiated after the four general principles were accepted.
If these four points are incorporated in a biodiversity technology
protocol, both developing and industrially advanced countries would stand
to gain. Industrially advanced countries would get assurances that patents
related to the Biodiversity Convention will be respected by all parties. In
exchange, developing countries would be guaranteed a share of the rent
created by the patents, compensating them for their efforts to maintain
biological diversity in territories within their national jurisdiction. The
special multilateral fund would ensure that higher prices would not put
related life-saving pharmaceuticals out of the reach of people in developing

75. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, at art. 23.
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countries who may need them. In short, a protocol based on these elements
would strike a workable balance between the individual rights sought by
industrially advanced countries and the social welfare sought by developing countries. Moreover, it would achieve this philosophical balance in a
way that would not place the burden entirely on either side.
CONCLUSION
Biological diversity is a good idea burdened by a bad treaty. The
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity will remain largely ineffective if
the United States ratifies it without pushing for changes to fix its shortcomings. Now that the Clinton administration has signed the agreement, the
United States can participate in future protocols and revisions as a party
rather than as an outsider. 76 The protocol outlined in this paper is a
possible starting point; it attempts to redirect the otherwise insuperable
political and economic dynamics of intellectual property rights so that they
support rather than prevent consensus.
Despite the volumes of arguments for and against a strong
international regime of intellectual property protection, neither side can
claim the moral high ground. Underlying the divergence over intellectual
property protection, however, is the more fundamental question of whether
a society holds individual rights or the common good as supreme. Absent
a set of supracultural values to mediate their differences, nations will have
to make a conscious effort to agree on common principles that will enable
them to deal with each other as moral equals if they are to address
environmental challenges in a cooperative way.
A core of such principles seems to be emerging in international law,
and some of them can be discerned from the rocky experience of the
Biodiversity Convention. An ecological imperative can supersede free trade
objectives, individual rights, and on occasion state sovereignty. But there
are limitations: the ecological imperative is only as strong as the scientific
research program that is attempting to explain it, one cannot "piggyback"
onto an ecological imperative non-ecological objectives of limited consensus, and there needs to be a clear and nonprejudicial separation between
trade issues that have direct environmental implications and those that do
not.
1. Ecological imperatives supersede individual rights. Even in such a
Lockean, pro-individual political environment as the United States, judicial

76. This assumes ratification of the treaty by the Senate.
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applications of the public trust doctrine have reaffirmed the underlying and
inalienable prerogative of the state to rearrange individual rights within its
jurisdiction-including rights of property-if common-heritage resources
are threatened. If and when the GATT begins to deal with the environmentrelated aspects of trade in an international context, even the most hallowed
principles of free trade will have to bow down to the greater common need
to protect common ecological resources. On occasion, the ecological
imperative may even justify limits on state sovereignty. The International
Court of Justice has stated that it is possible for certain special obligations
to be so compelling as to warrant their application erga omnes,' and
customary law suggests that one such obligation is to refrain from harming
the environment of other states or of areas beyond national jurisdiction.'
The question is how a valid ecological imperative is to be determined.
2. Ecologicalimperatives must be scientifically based. This is not to say
that environmental threats must pass the impossible test of scientific
certainty.' What it does mean, however, is that some methodologically
credible attempt must have been made to ascertain the magnitude of the
threat. Sheer speculation without any empirical or theoretical foundation
in the relevant science does not make a moral imperative80 A comparison

77. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain)
1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5). See also International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128
(Separate Opinion of July 11).
78. Restatement (Third) of the Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 601
(1987).
79. Any natural or social science that relies on statistical methods cannot attain certainty.
Hypothesis testing, the most widely used method of statistical analysis, results in
conclusions as to whether a parameter estimate is something other than zero within a 95
percent confidence interval. These conclusions are most often based on certain assumptions
about the random distribution of individual observations' deviation from the mean,
assumptions which themselves often involve guesswork. See A. Darnell, The Limits of
Econometrics (1990).
80. The precautionary principle, invoked in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and
referred to in the preamble of the Biodiversity Convention, states that "lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent"
environmental threats. United Nations Conf. Env't & Dev.: Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, 1992,31 I.L.M. 874, at 879 (1992); Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1,
at pmbl. As I have argued elsewhere, one may accept the precautionary principle and yet
still ask about the threshold of uncertainty at which the principle becomes relevant. Hurlbut,
supra note 73, at 350-351. A liberal yet defensible delimitation of this principle would still
give science an important role. That is, the precautionary principle would require preventive
measures if there were a scientific rationale for not ruling out the possibility of environmental harm. See P. Giindling, The Status of International Law of the Principle of Precautionary
Action, in The North Sea: Perspectives on Regional Environmental Cooperation 23, 26 (D.
Freestone & T. IjIstra eds., 1990).
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between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the successful
Montreal Protocol shows the difference science makes. The Montreal
Protocol enjoys a broad-based consensus behind a regime of substantive
control measures largely because of the well-developed research program
that quickly formed around the problem of ozone deterioration."' Loss of
species poses a tougher scientific problem, however, and the research
program is still evolving. In fact, a large part of the Convention on
Biological Diversity is devoted to developing the necessary research.' But
because no well-developed, policy-oriented research program currently
exists, debate over the Convention on Biological Diversity was easily mired
in older, non-ecological disagreements between industrial and developing
countries.
3. No piggybacking. As the discussion in this paper shows, the legal
weight of a valid ecological imperative cannot be imputed to non-ecological
issues linked only in theory and for which consensus is limited. The
Convention on Biological Diversity attempted to link the objective of
biological diversity with the objective of income redistribution, which
opened the door to confrontation between rich and poor states over
intellectual property rights. International environmental policies need to
avoid the error of misplaced aggregation. Ecological imperatives are readily
grounded in customary law and are a solid basis for treaty law. Seemingly
related non-ecological issues must be approached more circumspectly,
relying on more structured and consensual approaches through multilateral
institutions or direct bilateral agreements.
4. Trade-related issues with direct environmental consequences are
separablefrom other trade issues. This paper demonstrates how the principle
of separability might remedy one problem with the Convention on
Biological Diversity. A corollary to the principle of "no piggybacking,"
separability means that legitimate ecological imperatives justify exceptions
to normal trade rules, that the exceptions apply only to those cases that are
proved to have direct environmental consequences, and that the exceptions
in no way prejudice any other trade issue. The GATT already lays the
foundation for this principle in Article XX, which says that any GAIT
contracting party can enforce domestic measures "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health" or "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources" as long as such measures do not discriminate against imports and do not constitute disguised barriers to trade.

81. Hurlbut, supra note 73, at 346.
82. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 7, 12.
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Intellectual property rights will remain a contentious trade issue,
and there is nothing any environmental treaty can do to change that fact.
The gap between North and South is wide, and the economic forces are
formidable. But the wider disagreement need not prevent progress on a
biodiversity regime. Developing and industrially advanced countries can
agree to disagree on the trade-related aspects of intellectual property and
still reach a separate accord on a small list of products and processes related
to biological diversity. If the Biodiversity Convention is to be successful, it
must be something other than a money-grab by developing countries and
something other than a vehicle by which multinational corporations exploit
developing countries. Benefits and costs-like new rights and obligations-must be equitably shared by rich and poor countries alike.

